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Expanding the Neglected Role
of the Parent in the
Juvenile Court
RAYMOND F. VINCENT*
Until the enactment of sweeping changes in the California
Juvenile Court Law in 19761 the pareljt was only peripherally
involved when his child came before the court. He was under a
duty to attend the court sessions and could be cited to appear
and bring the child with him.2 If he disobeyed the citation, a
warrant could be issued for his arrest.3 He could be ordered to
pay the costs of legal representation, care and medical attention
furnished to the child while the child was in custody.4 In addi-
tion, he could be coerced into submitting to an order specifying
* J.D. Southwestern University School of Law 1953, Private Practice 1954.
Appointed to the Anaheim-Fullerton Municipal Court, 1961 and appointed to
the Orange County Superior Court in 1965. Served as member of the executive
committee of the Orange County Superior Court. Recipient of the Sigma Delta
Phi Freedom of Information Award.
1. Juvenile Court Law, ch. 1071. CAL. A.B. 3121 (1976).
2. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 661 (West Supp. 1976).
3. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 662 (West. 1972).
4. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 903, 903.1 (West 1972).
that he participate in a counseling program if the court per-
mitted the child to remain in the family home.
5
While preserving involvement in these limited areas, the 1976
legislation adds provisions subjecting the parent to direct or-
ders of the court concerning the care, custody, supervision and
conduct of the child.6 When considered in conjunction with con-
current changes designed to shift the treatment of delinquents
from institutions to the community, it is obvious that the legisla-
tive intent underlying the new procedure is to impose greater
responsibility on the parent for the conduct of his child and to
remedy, through judicial intervention, those conditions within
the family home which are factors contributing to the child's
delinquency. The role of the parent in juvenile court proceed-
ings has thus been changed from one of passive participation to
one in which the parent will become an active agent of the court
in implementating a program designed to remedy the child's
behavior problems.
These provisions of the new law do not represent the first
effort to deal with the juvenile delinquency problem by control-
ling or regulating the conduct of the parent. However, previous
attempts were designed to structure parental conduct by means
of criminal law sanctions; a significant feature of the 1976 law is
that the parent need not be found to be inadequate or unfit
before the court may intervene and direct the manner in which
the parent raises his child. If used wisely and with restraint, this
approach could prove to be a constructive and effective means
of dealing with the growing juvenile delinquency problem.
5. Welfare and Institutions Code Section 727 provides that when the minor
has been adjudged a dependent on any of the grounds specified in Welfare and
Institutions Code, Section 600(d) (neglect, cruelty, depravity or physical abuse)
and the court orders that a parent shall retain custody subject to the supervision
of a probation officer, the parent 3 h2 11 be required to participate in a counseling
program designated by the court. When the dependency status is based on any
of the other grounds specified in Section 600, and the parent is permitted to
retain custody, such counseling may be ordered.
When the minor has been adjudged a ward on any of the grounds specified in
Welfare and Institutions Code, Sections 601 or 602, and the parent is permitted
to retain custody, he may be ordered to participate with the child, in such a
program. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 727 (West Supp. 1976).
6. "The juvenile court may direct any and all reasonable orders to the
parents and guardians of the minor who is the subject of any proceedings under
this chapter as the court deems necessary and proper to carry out the provisions
of subdivision (1)." CAL.WELF. & INST. CODE § 727(2) (West Supp. 1976).
Welfare and Institutions Code Section 727(1) provides that when a minor nas
been adjudged a dependent child or ward of the court, the court may make any
and all reasonable orders for his care, supervision, custody, conduct,
maintenance, support and medical treatment. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 727(1)
(West Supp. 1976).
[Vol. 4:523, 1977] The Role of the Parent
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
THE PARENT'S ROLE IN JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
J. Edgar Hoover is quoted as saying that "juvenile crime could
be abated if parents were made to face legal and financial re-
sponsibilities for the criminal acts of their children. ' 7 His state-
ment is representative of the commonly held opinion that
juvenile delinquency can be traced to parental inadequacy and
neglect. However, the validity of this assumption was substan-
tially eroded by the findings of the President's Commission on
Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, Juvenile
Delinquency and Youth Crime.8 Even though the Report
deemed the family to be the first and most fundamental unit in
our society charged with the responsibility for developing the
child's potential, and although it stressed the importance of the
family relationship in the control of delinquency, it found many
contributing causes of delinquency outside the family. Urbani-
zation, social class, educational level and social instability were
identified as several of the factors possessing some relationship
to the inadequate home life of the delinquent. In many instances
well-meaning parents were found to be powerless to alter these
extraneous conditions and were as much their victims as were
their delinquent children.
The Report placed blame on parents in many situations. Lack
of affection, inconsistent mixtures of permissiveness and strict
discipline and lack of concern for the child's problems were
cited as common parental shortcomings. Yet the problem was
characterized as "parental poverty" rather than as parental per-
versity; it was recommended that, instead of being punished,
inadequate parents be offered job training, family planning and
educational improvement programs. While parents were found
to be at fault in some situations, social forces operating on the
family were found to be the more significant factor accounting
for the magnitude of the juvenile delinquency problem.
Aside from the findings of this respected study group, there
are abundant reasons why the time-honored concept that inade-
quate or neglectful parents are the principal cause of juvenile
7. Newsweek, April 2, 1956 at 95.
8. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME, 215 et
seq. (1967).
delinquency should be laid to rest.9 It is well known that many
wayward youngsters come from excellent homes presided over
by capable and concerned parents. But even the most watchful
parent cannot shield his child completely from the adverse in-
fluences arising from peer group associations, violence realis-
tically portrayed on television or the reports of adult misbe-
havior carried by the newspapers. These latter-day Tom Saw-
yers among our youthful population find neither the logs nor
the river capable of venting their spirit of adventure. The rele-
vation that the children of the President of the United States
sampled marijuana is an indication of the tendency of our youth
to seek new forms of excitement (though laws might be violated
in the process) even when they have had excellent home lives
and the best of parents.
Inadequate and irresponsible parents, no doubt, have a detri-
mental influence on children. However, as the findings of the
President's Commission indicate, these parents represent a sub-
stantial rather than a principal cause of juvenile delinquency.
Even so, reasons remain for making efforts to improve their
performances as parents and to motivate them to accept more
responsibility for their children's conduct. While such goals
might be sought in a cooperative manner by existing social
organizations, it would seem that greater parental response and
more effective results could be attained through the force of
law.
PUNISHING THE PARENT FOR THE CHILD'S MISBEHAVIOR
Ben B. Lindsey, a distinguished judge of the juvenile court in
Colorado in its early years, held the same beliefs as did J. Edgar
Hoover regarding the role of parents in juvenile delinquency.
His efforts led the legislature of that state to enact, in 1903, a law
providing that a parent who caused, encouraged or contributed
to the delinquency of his minor child was guilty of a misde-
meanor and could be fined or imprisoned.'0 Trial jurisdiction
was in the juvenile court and that court was authorized to sus-
pend the imposition of sentence if the parent complied with
certain conditions.
Judge Lindsey declared that this law "... is the most impor-
tant feature of the' juvenile law of this state. . .. The purpose of
this law is to compel careless homes to take care of their chil-
dren.""1
9. Alexander, What's This About Punishing Parents, FED. PROBATION, 23
(1948).
10. The Contributory Delinquency Law, ch. 94, 1903 COLO. SESS. LAW.
11. Lindsey, The Juvenile Laws of Colorado, 18 GREEN BAG 126, 127 (1906).
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He went on to state that:
Parents who are true to their own home and children are entitled to
have the benefits of a law that will insure the performance of such
duties, for the sancity [sic] and security of each home depends a great
deal on how well neighboring homes are also conducted. .. We must
recognize that over half of the original inmates of prisons and institu-
tions are from the youth of the nation who arrived at the prison
through neglect in childhood, and bad habits formed at the formative
period of life, between eight and sixteen years of age. . . It is much
better that the state should perform this function wisely, humanely
and while there is an opportunity to prevent crime, than to postpone
the evil day until the child has become a criminal, for the state is today
taking care of tens of thousands of its young men after they have
become criminals, when they might have been saved from lives of
crime by sane, sensible, and sympathetic interest by the state in boy-
hood.12
Judge Lindsey continued to praise the so-called Colorado
"Adult Delinquency Law" and, several years after its enact-
ment, declared that the court had "more than demonstrated" its
effectiveness in character-building when dealing with the child
and in homebuilding when dealing with the parent. Later, the
Colorado Supreme Court, in limiting the laws' application to the
parent or person having custody of the child, referred to the
wide approval and acceptance both locally and nationally and
to the favorable consideration given it by the leading nations of
Europe and Asia.
13
The New York Experience
Even though they were not supported by studies or statistics
the enthusiasic statements of Judge Lindsey and of the Col-
orado Supreme Court appear to have carried considerable
weight for a number of states soon adopted adult delinquency
laws. A New York statute,14 the stated purpose of which was to
make parents feel more responsible for the conduct of their
children, was adopted prior to the establishment of "children's
courts" as separate judicial entities in that state and at a time
when jurisdiction over parents cited under the law was vested in
the magistrates of the criminal courts. However, two surveys
conducted during a four-year period after that law's enactment
12. Id. at 130.
13. Gibson v. People, 44 Colo. 600, 601, 99 P. 333, 334 (1909).
14. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 289 as amended by ch. 655, 1905 N.Y. Laws.
revealed that, although the magistrates unanimously com-
mended its character and purpose, they rarely used the law.
Supporters of the statute were quick to point out that under
the highly praised Colorado law the parent and child stood
before the same court and that the reluctance of New York
magistrates to utilize the procedure was due to the absence of
that element. Consequently, when the legislature in 1909 was
considering the establishment of children's courts, it was
strongly urged that the adult delinquency statute be placed
within the jurisdiction of those courts so that parental inade-
quacy could be dealt with in conjunction with the child's
behavioral problem. Unfortunately, the legislation was
"miserably drawn"'15 in that it placed such jurisdiction in the
children's courts in the upper portion of the state but left it in
the adult criminal court in New York City. Nevertheless, the
proponents proclaimed "that of all the laws calculated to pre-
vent delinquency among children, those that punish, by fine or
imprisonment, the parents or other persons who contribute to
such delinquency are the most significant."' 6
Ten years later, in response to an inquiry into the effective-
ness of the statute, the Chief Clerk of the Children's Court of
New York City described it as a "dead letter" because that court
lacked jurisdiction over the parents and became his own investi-
gation of the criminal court records disclosed that only one case
was prosecuted under it.17 Subsequent legislation remedied this
shortcoming by placing jurisdiction under the statute in the
Children's Court of New York City.' 8 However, until the end of
World War II that statute was not used as a means of dealing
with the problems of juvenile delinquents in the Children's
Court of New York City, or elsewhere in the state.
The post-war upsurge in juvenile crime and delinquency
brought forth a demand from the public that those in positions
of authority take effective action to deal with the problem. Since
most persons who were questioned on the subject expressed the
opinion that parental inadequacy was the major cause of
juvenile misbehavior and since the "adult delinquency law" was
designed to place responsibility for the conduct of the child on
15. This was the view of the New York City Bar Association referring to the
New York Penal Code Section 494 as amended by Chapter 478 of the 1924 New
York Laws.
16. Abbott and Abbott, The Children's Court Bill, 11 N.Y. CHARITIES
PUBLICATIONS COMMITTEE 50 (1910).
17. Bates, The Possibilities and Methods of Increasing Parental Respon-
sibilities for Juvenile Delinquency, 12 J. CRIM. L. 61, 68 (1921).
18. Children's Court Act of the City of New York, ch. 254, 1924 N.Y. Laws.
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the parent, the stage was set for the first test of the effectiveness
of the long-dormant law.
Shortly after the New York Police Department announced its
intention to "crack down on parents who do not control their
children," Mrs. Genevieve Rivera was arrested and brought be-
fore the Children's Court on the charge that she had failed to
control her son while he was shooting a pellet gun to annoy
passersby. She was subsequently tried in that court and found
guilty of the charge.
While the result in the Rivera case appeared to be a step
toward the accomplishment of the purpose of the statute, it
raised many legal and philosophical conerrns. The President of
the Welfare Society of New York described the punishing of
parents as a means of solving the juvenile delinquency problem
as a "step backward."'19 Others maintained that Mrs. Rivera was
as much a victim of society as was her son. Financed by inter-
ested citizens and organizations, the appeal seriously ques-
tioned the jurisdiction of the Children's Court to hear adult
criminal matters. The Appellate Division held that, although the
Children's Court had jurisdiction to hear the matter, such pro-
ceedings should not be conducted in the usual informal manner
of that court but, rather, in accordance with the procedures of
the adult court; a finding of guilt based on proof beyond a
reasonable doubt supported by legally admissible evidence was
mandated. The decision of the trial court was reversed because
hearsay evidence had been received and utilized in the finding.20
The Rivera case marked the beginning and the end of the
New York City Police Department's campaign to prosecute in-
adequate parents as a means of curbing juvenile delinquency
even though the jurisdiction of the Children's Court in such
cases had finally been established. Perhaps the dissuading fac-
tor was the answer received by the judge of the Children's Court
to his inquiry addressed to the Juvenile Court of Toledo, Ohio,
where the prosecution of parents deemed inadequate had been
practiced for many years. Judge Paul W. Alexander, in his re-
ply, pointed out the difficulty of proving the case against an
alleged "inadequate parent" and asserted that punishing par-
19. New York Times, Feb. 1, 1947, Part 2, at 1.
20. Human v. Rivera, 272 App. Div. 352, 71 N.Y.S. 2d 321, (Sup. Ct. 1947).
ents was no panacea. Commenting on an extensive study made
by the Toledo court he said:
In fine, we might say our study seems to show that to punish parents
who contributed to the delinquency or neglect of their children accom-
plishes very few, if any, of the things claimed for it except revenge,
that in some cases where the parent is refractory and resists the
casework approach, a certain amount of actual punishment may
bring about cooperation, that in selected cases, where the other
methods have failed, prosecution and the threat of punishment are
rather effective.
21
The prevailing judicial philosophy in New York shortly after
the Rivera case was expressed in a statement issued by the
judges of the Children's Court in which they voiced their oppo-
sition to a proposed anti-vandalism law:
The duty by law of the Children's Court is to treat, rehabilitate, and
not punish the child. Treatment of the child requires parental sym-
pathy and cooperation. Punishment of parents creats and widens a
breach between parent and child, thus impeding treatment, and ren-
ders work with the parent all but impossible...22
Several years later the adult delinquency act was removed
from the jurisdiction of the Children's Court, was classified as a
general criminal law and was placed within the jurisdiction of
magistrates' courts. 23 No further attempt was made to use it as a
means of correcting parental shortcomings in an effort to mod-
ify the delinquent conduct of children. Instead, enforcement
was limited to punitive action against those, including parents,
who by their acts, usually of a sexual or immoral nature, con-
tributed to the delinquency of a minor.
Thus, while New York sought to reap the benefits which
Judge Lindsey attributed to a law which subjected the parent to
criminal penalties for neglect or inadequacy which contributed
to the delinquency of his child, the enactment of such a statute
did not result in the attainment of that goal. Although the fail-
ure to utilize the procedure at the outset was attributed to the
misplacement of jurisdiction over the parent, the law was inex-
plicably rejected even when both parent and child stood before
the same court. Although an ideal factual situation was eventu-
ally presented and successfully prosecuted, and even though the
reversing appellate opinion expressed approval of the proce-
dure, further efforts to utilize the law were nevertheless aban-
doned, apparently due to disapproval of the approach both by
the judiciary and by a vocal public element.
21. Alexander, What's This About Punishing Parents, FED. PROBATION 23,
29 (1948).
22. New York City Laws int. No. 884, 1020 (1952). This law was commonly
known as the anti-vandalism law and was never chaptered nor enacted.
23. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 494 as amended by ch. 478 1924 N.Y. Laws.
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It cannot be said that the approach advocated by Judge Lind-
sey was given a fair test in New York. Perhaps the validity of
Judge Lindsey's unsubstantiated claims was doubted and it was
felt that youngsters who had had the benefit of the clean fresh
air and open spaces of Colorado weren't very delinquent in the
first place. Yet, Judge Alexander, having had the benefit of an
intensive study based on the use of a similar statute over a
period of years, indicated that the procedure was useful in cer-
tain situations. The expressed opposition in New York centered
on the punishment of the parent. In practice, the imposition of
sentence could have been suspended on the condition that the
parent comply with certain court orders concerning the man-
agement of the family home and the regulation of the minor's
conduct. To the extent that it could have been utilized in that
fashion the law might have been useful in reducing juvenile
delinquency in New York.
California Contributing Statutes
There is no indication that California has ever followed the
scheme of Judge Lindsey's "adult delinquency law." The pres-
ent Penal Code Section 272, enacted in 1961, is based on former
Welfare and Institutions Code Section 702 which placed original
jurisdiction over persons charged with conduct contributing to
the delinquency of a minor in the juvenile court. Under that
former statute, the defendant was arraigned in the juvenile
court in accordance with the procedures specified in the Penal
Code. If he pled guilty, the juvenile court had jurisdiction to
impose sentence or to grant probation. If he pled not guilty, the
matter was transferred to the superior court for trial and any
further proceedings. The defendant was entitled to a jury trial
in the superior court on the misdemeanor charge.
Although the purpose of the former statute was held to be the
safeguarding of children from those influences which would
tend to cause them to become delinquent, the procedure requir-
ing the case to be transferred to the adult court on a plea of not
guilty was inconsistent with the concept of modifying parental
behavior as a part of the proceedings involving the child. Unlike
Judge Lindsey's approach, the main California objective was to
punish the defendant for his misconduct; any benefit to the
child due to the rectification of parental inadequacies was inci-
dental.
The legislative purpose in enacting Penal Code Section 272
was to abolish the costly procedure of trying misdemeanor
charges by jury in the superior court. Complete jurisdiction was
placed in the municipal court and the district attorney was
given the responsibility of prosecuting such cases. 24 If there was
even any intention to utilize the California contributing statute
as a means of remedying the child's delinquency problem by
requiring the parent to accept the responsibility for his child's
conduct in the manner advocated by Judge Lindsey, the 1961
legislative change (whereby jurisdiction was placed over the
parent in the adult court) frustrated that intention by creating
the same situation which was blamed for making the earlier
New York law unworkable.
A review of the California cases decided both before and after
the 1961 legislative change fails to disclose any consistent use of
the contributing law as a tool for correcting parental inade-
quacies in conjunction with juvenile delinquency proceedings.
Rather, it appears that parents were prosecuted only for specif-
ic acts committed in the presence of, or having a direct influence
on, the minor.25 Quite often the law was invoked against parents
accused of neglect, abuse or other forms of mistreating their
children. However, even in that area, the common remedy was
to withhold custody in the dependency proceedings until the
parent was found capable of caring for the child and until he
agreed to accept certain conditions imposed upon him when
home placement was ultimately ordered.
The failure of California juvenile courts to utilize the criminal
law sanctions available under the contributing statute as a
means of remedying parental inadequacies is most likely due to
a combination of the absence of any valid indication that this
method had been used effectively elsewhere and the
overwhelming weight of respected professional opinion in op-
position to it. 26 Judge Lindsey's unsubstantiated claims are
meaningless when compared to the evaluation made by Judge
24. 36 STATE BAR J. 862, 865 (1961).
25. People v. Lamanuzzi, 77 Cal. App. 301, 246 P. 557 (1926). People v.
Bergotini, 172 Cal. 717, 158 P. 198 (1916). Allegations that the father was
intoxicated in presence of his children, that the children lacked parental control,
and, that the home of the mother was an unfit place for children were insuffi-
cient to state an offense due to failure to allege that acts of parents were
committed in presence of children or had any direct effect on the morals of the
minors.
26. Rubin, Should Parents be Held for Juvenile Delinquency? 34 Focus,
March 1955 at 35. "Wherever the concept takes hold that parents who fail should
be punished, it should be exposed as a delusion; wherever it has been put into
practice, it should be banished as quackery."
[Vol. 4:523, 1977] The Role of the Parent
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
Alexander on the basis of a study of five hundred cases. Aside
from the negative attitude of the experts, the self-defeating na-
ture of the punitive approach is a sufficient reason to deem it an
effective method of dealing with juvenile delinquency. To
punish the parent is to punish the child; the penalty, whether a
fine or imprisonment, affects the entire family of which the
child is an interdependent member.
COERCING PARENTAL COOPERATION
California juvenile courts, ignoring the punitive approach as
a means of influencing parental conduct, have generously in-
dulged in the practice of obtaining the cooperation of parents by
threatening to deprive them of custody. Dependency cases are
particularly suited to this approach since the usual basis for
that status is parental neglect, and the justification for imposing
conditions on the parent when custody is restored is the need to
insure the well-being of the child. However, the parent's agree-
ment to abide by conditions in order to regain custody is also
likely to be forthcoming in delinquency cases, often because of
the financial burden the parent would face should his wayward
child be institutionalized. In a dependency case the conditions
are expressed to the parent. His agreement to abide by them
under the supervision of a probation officer or social worker is
the justification for the court's ordering the return of the child
to his custody. In a delinquency case the conditions are a part of
the order releasing the child to his parents. The parent's accept-
ance of these orders is implied from his failure to object to them.
In neither type of cases is the parent under a direct court order
which could be the subject of a contempt citation; the sanction,
if any, for failure to comply with these orders is to remove the
child from the custody of his parent.
Although it is superior to the punitive approach as a means of
rectifying those parental shortcomings which contribute to the
minor's delinquent or dependent condition, the practice of with-
holding custody in order to gain the cooperation of the parent
27. Criminal Liability of Parents for Failure to Control Their Children, 6
VAL. L. REV. 332, 352 (1971-72).
has been severely criticized. 28 However, there is uniform recogni-
tion of the necessity for using this procedure in cases of ag-
gravated abuse or neglect where the well-being of the child far
outweighs any rights the parent might have regarding his
custody.
Although it lacks the penal aspects of proceedings under the
contributing law, depriving the parent of custody is not without
serious consequences to the parent. Parents who are weak and
frustrated may look upon the removal of their children from
their homes as indications of their failures as parents. Further,
removal may make it extremely difficult for parents to re-estab-
lish themselves in their proper roles at a future time. It is likely
that many parents are unable to accept the state's act (taking
custody) as one founded on the best interests of the child but
rather view it as a form of punishment for their inadequacies. 29
Therefore, in formulating its order regulatiug the conditions
under which the parent might regain custody, the court should
be mindful of parental attitudes and should direct its efforts
toward structuring a program which will give the parent the
impression that he is being helped and not coerced in his at-
tempt to resolve the problems of his child.
DIRECT ORDERS To PARENTS-A NEW APPROACH
The provisions of the 1976 legislation which enable the
juvenile court to make direct orders to the parent for the care,
custody, maintenance and control of the minor 30 are designed to
accomplish the goals sought under the punitive approach ad-
vocated by Judge Lindsey without simultaneously penalizing
the parent. Under court direction and without the threats of
penal sanctions or of custodial deprivations the parent can now
be required to assume responsibility for the conduct of his child
and to rectify those home conditions which have been identified
as factors causally related to juvenile delinquency. He may also
be ordered to participate with the child in a counseling program
for the purpose of dealing with the particular behavior problem
as it affects the child's relationship to the family.3 The only
limitations placed on such orders by the statute are that they
must be reasonable and be deemed necessary and proper by the
court to effectuate the disposition of the case.
28. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of Neglected Children: A Search
for Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985 (1975).
29. Dobson, The Juvenile Court and Parental Rights, 4 FAM. L. Q. 393
(1970).
30. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 727(2) (West Supp. 1976).
31. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 727 (West Supp. 1976).
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Inasmuch as the failure to obey any order of the court is
punishable by way of contempt proceedings, 32 the parent does
act under some sort of threat. However, unlike proceedings
under the contributing statute, court orders made in accordance
with the new law do not imply or allocate blame for the child's
condition. In view of the findings of numerous studies on the
subject identifying parental inadequacy as a substantial cause
of juvenile delinquency,3 3 a liberal use of the new law therefore
appears to be justified for the purpose of instructing parents
regarding the steps to be taken in solving the delinquency prob-
lems of their children. However, there are a number of factors
which may inhibit the availability and effectiveness of the pro-
cedure including jurisdictional problems, parental rights and
the limitations on judicial intervention into family life.
Juvenile Court Jurisdiction Over Parents
Under the new law the parent can be subjected to direct or-
ders of the court concerning the manner in which he raises his
child, manages his home and, perhaps, conducts his own life.
While preexisting jurisdictions to make orders for paying the
costs of care and legal services can be justified as a form of civil
action placed within the juvenile court in a manner akin to the
prosecution procedure under the former adult delinquency stat-
utes, the basis for jurisdiction to make orders regulating pa-
rental conduct is not entirely clear. Whatever legal responsibili-
ty a parent may have for his child's conduct remains within the
jurisdiction of the civil and criminal courts.34 If jurisdiction of
the juvenile court is founded on parental inadequacy, it appears
that the due process requirement is not met in the absence of a
procedure permitting the parent to be heard on the issue. The
new law does not require any judicial finding concerning the
parent before it may issue its orders. Consequently, if juris-
diction over the parent exists, it arises from the fact of par-
enthood alone. Prior to the enactment of the new law such
jurisdictional concerns did not exist because, in dealing with the
child's problem, the court was able to indirectly induce parental
32. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 512 (West 1972).
33. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND AD-
MINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME, (1967); Lud-
wig, Delinquent Parents and the Criminal Law, 5 VAND. L. REV. 719-20 (1951-52).
34. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.1 (West 1973), CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (West 1970).
participation by threatening to punish or by otherwise coercing
the parent in a variety of ways.
A distinguished authority in the field doubts the existence of
juvenile court jurisdiction over parents.35 Research has failed to
disclose any contrary position. Perhaps the absence of any con-
troversy in this area is due to the absence of prior legislation
requiring the parent to submit to the direct orders of the court in
the manner provided by the new law.
Since the procedure permitted by the 1976 legislation is con-
ditioned solely on the fact of parenthood, jurisdiction to address
the orders to the parent will most likely be upheld under the
common law doctrine of parens patriae, a panacea widely used
in the interpretation of juvenile court law. Although they are
also worthy of serious consideration under the policy power
theory, parental rights are easily cast aside under the parens
patriae concept which is founded solely on the public's concern
for the child's well-being. This theory furnishes the justification
for issuing orders to parents in the absence of showing of inade-
quacy since the state, as the ultimate parent, may utilize the
services of the natural parent to provide any needs of the child.
The Rights of Parent and Child
The orders issued under the procedure established by the new
law should be consistent with the rights of both parent and
child. It has been a basic tenet of the law that parents have
broad freedom with regard to child rearing. Some courts have
suggested that the principle of family privacy and autonomy
may be constitutionally protected. The Supreme Court has
stated:
The Court has frequently emphasized the importance of the family.
The rights to conceive and raise one's children has been deemed
'essential' ... The integrity of the family unit has found protection in
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment... 36
In recent years the state has assumed an ever-increasing role
in child rearing. Although they have usually favored parental
autonomy, courts and commentators have also been ambivalent
regarding the proper balance to be struck between that doctrine
and the parens patriae concept. Many state statutes preface
their provisions with statements affirming the inviolability of
the family and yet authorize substantial intervention.37 Califor-
35. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of Neglected Children: A Search
for Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985, 1036 (1975).
36. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
37. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119(1) (West 1969).
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nia law accords recognition to the importance of the family
home38 but allows state intervention to a considerable degree.
The likelihood of a clear resolution of the conflict between the
duty of the state to intervene in the interest of protecting the
child and the rights of the parent is remote. However, even those
who most strongly uphold the parens patriae doctrine agree
that the least intervention necessary should be practiced. Fortu-
nately, this is an appropriate framework for the application of
the new law.3
9
Even though the state under the parens patriae doctrine has
the duty to see that every child within its borders receives prop-
er care and treatment,40 children are nevertheless deemed "per-
sons" within the meaning of the Bill of Rights and their constitu-
tional rights must be recognized.41 These rights have been held
to be separate from those of the parent. 42 If the court views the
minor as a part of a family system rather than as an autono-
mous individual living in the home, its parental orders would
ordinarily prescribe rules of conduct rather than constitutional
rights and parental authority would consequently prevail over
the wishes of the child. However, there is a potential for conflict
in some areas such as religious preference. Judicial intervention
is not justified to the extent that an order to the parent would
have the effect of depriving the child of a constitutional right
since the effect of such a directive would be to create, rather
than to resolve, conflict within the family structure.43
38. "The purpose of this chapter is to secure for each minor under the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court such care and guidance, preferably in his own
home, as will serve the spiritual, emotional, mental and physical welfare of the
minor..."
39. Prior to the enactment of the 1976 legislation, intervention has been, for
the most part, in the form of casework by probation officers and social workers.
The intervention discussed in this article consists of the court's order requiring
the parent to perform certain acts or to refrain from some type of conduct with
reference to his child or the family home. However, it may also be in a form
which requires his submission to the activities of caseworkers.
Limitations have been suggested on the extent of intervention in neglect cases.
See note 28 supra. The standards suggested therein are worthy of consideration
in determining the extent of use of the procedure established by the new law.
40. In re McDonald, 201 N.W.2d 447, 453 (1972).
41. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
42. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
43. Aikman, The Child's Right to a Child-Centered Disposition, Vol. 25,
No. 2 Juv. JUST. 10 (1974).
Limitations on Judicial Intervention
The new law vests broad discretion in the juvenile court re-
garding both the nature and the number of orders which it may
direct to the parent. Undoubtedly, the reasonableness of the
directives will be the subject of appellate scrutiny more often
than will be their necessity or propriety. However, whether the
juvenile court was justified in issuing such orders initially will
seldom be seriously questioned on appeal.
Presiding over a program designed to rectify the child's delin-
quency problem, the juvenile court judge may seek to improve
family home life so thoroughly that he risks assuming the role of
a benevolent despot. Inasmuch as his information is gleaned
from reports of probation officers and social workers who are
for the most part, upper middle class college graduates, he may
be inclined to view such commonly used descriptions as "un-
tidy" homes, "dominant" parents or "manipulative" children
with far greater concern than such appellations deserve. Seldom
will the judge be presented a social study report which does not
identify some inadequacy in the family home, be it so minute as
breakfast dishes in the kitchen sink discovered during a noon
visit or so gross as an utterly unconcerned parent. It is unlikely
that any home is absolutely perfect in every respect and many
are in need of substantial improvements in order to be classified
as adequate. Consequently, the opportunities for issuing orders
to correct adverse conditions abound. However, the assumption
that judicial intervention to correct every deficiency will make
the family home better is invalid.
Under the new law, the order which may be directed to the
parent must not only be reasonable but it must also be proper
and necessary. In meeting this last requirement the court should
first identify the causal relationship between the isolated defi-
ciency and the delinquent condition of the child. While this may
not be a difficult task when the court encounters a parent who
permits his child to roam the streets at all hours, a less identifi-
able relationship exists when the parent is extremely rigid in
exercising his authority over the child and seldom displays any
affection toward him. The mere fact that parental conduct or
home conditions can be made better by a court order does not
alone justify the issuance of one to the parent. Unless the con-
duct or condition sought to be changed is causally related to the
child's behavior problem, judicial interference is both unneces-
sary and unwarranted.
Not every deficiency which has been identified as a contribut-
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ing factor in the child's delinquency pattern requiring a court
order for its rectification will meet the further requirement of
propriety. For example, although the excessive hours a father is
employed may be identified as a causative factor in that insuffi-
cient time may exist for the normal father-son activities, yet the
needs of the family may be such that any diminishment in earn-
ings would result in financial disaster which would affect every
member of the family. Even if it were deemed a reasonable
method of dealing with the child's problem, an order requiring
the father to lessen his hours of work would still be inappro-
priate.
The reasonableness of an order directed to the parent may be
examined from two points of view. The first consideration
should be whether the order tends to correct the deficiency
which has been identified. A requirement that a child be in the
family home no later than a certain hour of the night has the
effect of diminishing his opportunities to engage in late-hour
mischief. An order requiring the parent to deliver the child to
the school in the morning is likely to diminish a truancy prob-
lem. On the other hand, ordering an unwilling child to partici-
pate in Bible study would not tend to overcome the minor's use
of illegal drugs.
The second aspect of the order's reasonableness concerns the
ability of the parent to perform it. Perhaps a tour of Europe
would inspire the child to greater interest in his school work.
However, if the tour were beyond the financial ability of the
parent, an order requiring it would be both unreasonable and
improper.
Those orders addressed to parents which do not meet these
statutory requirements will not be enforceable by contempt pro-
ceedings. However, there are additional reasons for the juvenile
court judiciary to exercise restraint as to both the nature and
the number of directives they issue to parents. Parents are as
likely as their children to the excessive use of authority and a set
of rules covering every aspect of family life may not be well
received in most cases. Parents should not be deprived of their
rightful role in child raising and the existence of the new proce-
dure of involving the parent in juvenile court proceedings con-
cerning his child should not be the impetus for re-structuring
the family home to fit a specific pattern prescribed by the state.
Intervention for the purpose of resolving those adverse condi-
tions and conflicts which have been identified as contributing
causes of the child's problem offers the best hope of attaining
the still worthy goals sought by Judge Lindsey without violating
the rights of the child or those of members of his family.44
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
It is a common notion that juvenile delinquency can be traced
to the failure of the parent to properly perform his duties in
raising his child. A good family life is recognized as advan-
tageous to a child's development. When a youngster "goes
wrong" it is believed that his parent has failed to provide a
proper home atmosphere and is, therefore, responsible for the
child's problem.
Studies have identified inadequate parents as a cause of delin-
quency; however, they report that many other causes may be
operating at the same time, some of which are beyond the con-
trol of the parent. In perspective, inadequate parents are more
properly described as a substantial, rather than as a major
cause of juvenile delinquency.
It has been noted that the procedure of prosecuting parents
for the misconduct of their children, although it was highly
praised by its sponsor, did not receive judicial acceptance in one
state, and that an intensive study during a ten-year period of the
procedure's use in another state produced the conclusion that it
did not yield the results that had been promised. Although the
difficulty of establishing the causal relationship between the
conduct of that parent and the delinquency of his child is cited
as one reason for the failure of this approach, the harm to the
family resulting from the imposition of criminal sanctions upon
the parent is also a substantial negative factor.
California juvenile courts, wisely abstaining from the process
of punishing parents as a means of controlling juvenile delin-
quency, have nevertheless indulged in the widespread practice
of coercing parental cooperation by threatening to deprive the
parent of custody. Although it is less deserving of criticism than
the punitive approach, this practice also has its shortcomings.
Its negative effect on the parent's morale and the excessive
amount of intervention into family life it promises are cited as
factors inhibiting its effectiveness.
44. Johnson, The Juvenile Offender and His Family, Vol. 26, No. 1 Juv.
JUST. 31 (1975).
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The 1976 California legislative enactment, which enables the
juvenile court to make direct orders to the parent for the care,
custody, maintenance and control of his child, presents an op-
portunity to involve the parent in the process of resolving his
child's problems in a meaningful manner. Although the parent
has now been made subject to the usual contempt penalties for
disobeying court orders, he has nevertheless been spared the
stigma of blame inherent in the punitive approach and the anx-
iety and pressures associated with judicial threats to deprive
him of custody.
The constitutional basis of the juvenile court's jurisdiction
over the parent is likely to be found in the common law doctrine
of parens patriae. Under this concept the parent need not be
entirely deprived of his role in rearing his child and the state, as
the ultimate parent, should preempt the parent's authority only
to the extent necessary to promote the best interest of the child.
While the new law offers an opportunity to involve the parent
in a program to resolve his child's delinquency problems, it also
presents the danger of excessive judicial intervention into fam-
ily life. The requirement that the orders directed to the parent be
reasonable, necessary and proper is not a serious obstacle to the
imposition of an all-but-endless set of rules governing every
aspect of the family's structure.
The assumption that every child's delinquent situation is due
to some parental inadequacy is invalid. Equally without merit is
the premise that every parent of such a youngster is in need of
direction concerning the manner in which he should raise the
child. Orders under the new law should be issued to parents
only to correct conduct or conditions which have been identified
as being casually related to the child's behavior problem.
The new law provides a new approach to goals which have not
been reached for over seventy years. The parent now stands
beside his child in juvenile court. His responsiveness to judicial
directions for the purpose of resolving his child's problems will
depend in large measure on the perception, wisdom and sound
discretion of the court. Although the method advocated by
Judge Lindsey deserved its fate, his goals remain as worthy of
attainment as ever.
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